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Chapter 5 
Musicology for Art Historians 
Jonathan Hicks (University of Oxford) 
 
 
If you consider yourself a musicologist, this chapter may not be for you. As the 
title implies, my aim is not to break new ground in the field so much as to 
introduce the lay of the land, as I currently find it, to those whose disciplines do 
not ordinarily address music as an object of study. Since many scholars of visual 
culture will already be familiar with aspects of the academic study of music, the 
following pages are not intended as a beginner’s guide or “how to” manual. 
Instead, I propose a holistic, if necessarily selective and subjective, account of the 
history and priorities of (predominantly Anglo-American) musicology. What this 
brief survey lacks in detail, I hope it makes up for in usefulness. At any rate, my 
remarks and observations are not offered as conclusive statements on the 
discipline, but rather as a means of “joining the dots” and focusing further 
discussion. I begin by addressing musicology’s problematic disciplinary identity 
before introducing some late-nineteenth- and twentieth-century figures whose 
work has formed the backdrop to a number of ongoing debates. I then consider 
what might be called the “privileged objects” of musical study as well as the 
challenge to music’s object status signaled by performance-oriented approaches. 
The chapter ends in optimistic mood with some personal reflections on the present 
state of musicology and speculation regarding future areas of research. While all 
of the above is offered with art historians in mind, I do not attempt to flag up each 
shared interest or every occasion for dialogue, but prefer to leave it to readers to 
establish such connections for themselves.  
 
 
Discipline and Publish 
 
Musicology has a discipline problem—in fact, it has several. Despite the 
distinguished position of something called “music” in the long history of the 
liberal arts, and the even longer history of musical enquiry reaching back to Al-
Kindi, Aristoxenus, Pythagorus, et al., there remains a sense that musicology 
needs to justify its place in the modern academy. No doubt some of our 
colleagues in the “hard” sciences will always detect a whiff of dilettantism in the 
study of any form of art—I have been laughed at more than once by engineers and 
chemists when explaining what I teach to undergraduate students—and every 
musicologist has been exasperated at one time or another by the fundamental 
misunderstanding behind the question “what instrument do you play?” Yet the 
ever-present need to communicate our research and account for our positions is 
felt especially strongly in the current neoliberal climate wherein higher education 
is increasingly instrumentalized as a means of providing intellectual labor for the 
administrative cadres of trans-national corporations. As the recent funding cuts 
made by the United Kingdom’s coalition government demonstrate all too clearly, 
arts and humanities teaching is now considered a poor relation to the teaching of 
STEM subjects (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) on account 
of the latter being understood to add more value to the workforce of “UK Plc.” In 
practical terms, this has already resulted in departmental closures and has forced 
all of us working under such hostile conditions to reassess the arguments we make 
on our subject’s behalf.  
 Though such existential crises are hardly unique to musicology—or the 
UK, for that matter—they underscore the extent to which the history of any 
discipline is inextricable from its ideological and institutional contexts. Back in 
1885, when Guido Adler (1855-1941) was preparing his now-famous essay on 
“The Scope, Aim, and Method of Musicology” for the first issue of the 
Vierteljahresschrift für Musikwissenschaft (Musicology Quarterly), his 
disciplinary circumstances were considerably different from those of the present 
day. As a salaried academic in fin-de-siècle Vienna, Adler was not especially 
concerned with establishing the social or economic impact of the new “music-
science,” but he was passionately committed to securing its independence from 
general historical studies and, just as importantly, its credibility vis-à-vis the 
better-established fields of art and literary criticism. In addition to exemplifying 
the sometimes anxious positioning of musicology in relation to other forms of 
academic enquiry—musicologists, it seems, are perennially worried about 
“lagging behind” their colleagues in other subjects—Adler’s essay highlights 
another source of institutional tension when it proposes a division between 
historische Musikwissenschaft and systematische Musikwissenschaft. The precise 
differences between Adler’s “historical” and “systematic” approaches are less 
important than the pattern they set for subsequent distinctions within the study of 
music.  
 These internal divisions are perhaps clearest in North America, where 
there are separate graduate programs and scholarly societies for musicology, 
ethnomusicology, and music theory. Traditionally, the first of this trio has been 
concerned with the history of European art music, while the second has attended 
to the musical cultures of the wider world, and the third has taken a more note-
based, or “analytical” approach to the study of musical structures. In some ways, 
the boundaries between the three major groupings are becoming ever more 
porous: one recent conference, for example, brought together the annual meetings 
of the American Musicological Society, the Society for Ethnomusicology, and the 
Society for Music Theory in a single all-encompassing event. Yet it would be 
misleading to suggest there are no antagonisms or suspicions between the 
established sub-disciplines, just as it would be misleading to suggest there are no 
other ways of differentiating the study of music. As you would expect, it is 
common for professional conversations and solidarities to form around significant 
chronological periods, geographical areas, and/or sub-divisions of style. There is 
also a sizeable body of research incorporating the study of music into the 
psychological, neurological, and biological sciences, as well as work on music 
and dance, music in film, music therapy, music technology, arts administration, 
and, of course, performance training and composition. Taken as a whole, then, 
musicology—or “music studies” if you prefer, since musicology is more or less 
synonymous in North America with historical musicology—is a remarkably broad 
church. This breadth and diversity is arguably one of the discipline’s greatest 
strengths, but it might also be a strategic weakness when it comes to articulating a 
coherent account of the subject’s values in the face of the aforementioned threats 
to university teaching and research. 
 
 
Landmarks in the Field 
 
Musicology, like any such scholarly profession, has a number of “landmark” 
figures whose work is so familiar to practitioners in the field that it becomes a 
means of orienting oneself in relation to ongoing debates. Given the centrality of 
Austro-German repertoire in the early years of musical research—not to mention 
Adler’s status as a “founding father” of the discipline—it is unsurprising that 
some of the most influential scholars of the early- and mid-twentieth century had 
names with a decidedly Teutonic ring. Heinrich Schenker (1868-1935), for 
example, developed a system of analysis based on the age-old principles of voice-
leading and “species counterpoint” (essentially a set of practical instructions for 
composing multi-part vocal music) which encouraged users to look beyond the 
surface details of a composition in order to reveal—or arguably construct—the 
harmonic Ursatz (fundamental structure) underpinning the work as a whole. 
Schenker’s interest in the “organic” unity of musical structures was informed by a 
prominent strand of nineteenth-century German aesthetics, and one of the 
expressed purposes of his analyses was to establish the supremacy of certain 
Austro-German works within the broader European tonal tradition. It is surely no 
coincidence that Schenker was working at a time when this very tradition was 
perceived to be under threat by post-tonal composers such as Arnold Schoenberg 
(1874-1951), who was himself an influential music theorist. Indeed, it is well 
documented that Schenker was an arch reactionary whose analytical tracts are 
notorious for their aggressive nationalism and overt anti-Semitism. Luckily for 
him, however, the offending passages were edited out of the earliest translations 
of his works, thus leaving his techniques free to gain a lasting foothold in the 
music departments of the post-WWII United States.   
 Another German-speaking scholar to have a considerable posthumous 
impact on Anglophone musicology was the Frankfurt School social theorist 
Theodor W. Adorno (1903-1969). As an anti-totalitarian leftist, Adorno was 
fiercely critical of both the “culture industry,” as he termed it, and any form of art 
deemed complicit in the suppression of autonomous subjectivity: notably Igor 
Stravinsky’s (1882-1971) anti-expressive neo-classicism and Jean Sibelius’s 
(1865-1957) symphonic “cult of nature.” Adorno’s polemics against the 
emotional manipulation of film music and the de-individualizing tendencies of 
what he mis-termed “jazz” have been poured over and parodied in equal measure. 
His championing of Viennese serialism—which has sometimes been used to 
bolster the claims of an infamously unpopular repertoire—also leaves him open to 
the charge of music-philosophical nepotism since he was not only a personal 
acquaintance of Schoenberg’s, but also took composition lessons from one of his 
best-known students, Alban Berg (1885-1935). Partly because of these 
criticisms—and also because of broader objections to work-centered analysis, 
which I shall come to shortly—the vogue for Adornian musicology has waned in 
recent years. Nevertheless, it would be hard to overstate the significance of his 
essays (and paraphrases thereof) to the course of recent debate: by insisting that 
the study of musical change was always already the study of social change, 
Adorno’s idiosyncratic approach to musical aesthetics encouraged a great many 
writers to take note of, and develop alternative approaches to, what Tia DeNora 
has termed the “music and society nexus.”1 
                                                     
1 Tia DeNora, “Formulating Questions – the ‘Music and Society’ Nexus.” In Music in Everyday 
 One such writer was Carl Dahlhaus (1928-1989), whose wide-ranging 
studies were, in the best dialectical tradition, simultaneously informed by and 
critical of Adorno’s sociology of music. The key term for Dahlhuas was “relative 
autonomy,” a notion that signaled the limitations of both aesthetic hermeticism 
and social determinism.2 Appropriately enough, this disciplinary stance appears to 
have been at least partially contingent on the political circumstances in which 
Dahlhaus worked. As Anne C. Schreffler has argued, Dahlhaus’s position as a 
West-German musicologist operating at the height of the Cold War casts new 
light on his robust objections to the Marxist models of musical production favored 
by his East-German counterpart Georg Knepler (1906-2003). While the vast 
majority of Knepler’s work remains untranslated, Dahlhaus’s writings were 
something of a hit in English and North American music departments throughout 
the 1980s. The questions he raised about the objects and methods of musical 
enquiry may well have been shaped by the intellectual climate of Cold War 
Berlin, but they also marked a turning point in the history of the discipline: 
whatever the shortcomings of his own approach, musicology after Dahlhaus was 
more ambitious, reflexive, and theoretically literate than it had ever been before.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 1-20. 
2 See, for example, Carl Dahlhaus, “The ‘Relative Autonomy’ of Music History.” In Foundations 
of Music History, trans. by J. B. Robinson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 108-
128.  
  
Treasure and Pleasure 
 
The surest sign of disciplinary upheaval in the 1980s and 1990s was the critique 
of the musical “masterpiece.” Once upon a time it was self-evident that the 
purpose of musicology was to attend to the great works of genius bestowed upon 
the present by the great men of the past. Chief among these feted figures were the 
likes of J. S. Bach (1685-1750), Ludwig van Beethoven (1770-1827), and Richard 
Wagner (1813-1883)—all of whom, we might note, were German-speaking 
composers. While there is no need to rehearse the discourse on canon formation 
here—still less to repeat the truism that universalist claims can be grounded in 
particular times and places—it is worth addressing how canonicity has played out 
in the performing, as opposed to plastic or literary, arts. You might think it was 
obvious that a performing art requires performers, yet the role of performance has 
not always enjoyed a prominent place in the academic study of music. Indeed, it 
was long assumed that the principle treasures of musicology were the objects 
made by composers (i.e., scores), and that the task of scholarship was first to 
establish the provenance and authenticity of such objects (usually by reference to 
principles of textual criticism imported from the discipline of philology), then to 
consider the composer’s intentions by relating the features of the object to what 
was known of the man—or, very, very occasionally, the woman—in question.  
 If the methodology described above sounds distinctly old-fashioned, it is 
only because a number of writers successfully campaigned against the fetishizing 
of musical objects in favor of a broader understanding of musical history and 
experience. One such writer was Lydia Goehr, whose account of The Imaginary 
Museum of Musical Works located a tipping point—sometime around 1800—
when music ceased to be considered an activity for doing and started to be seen as 
an object of contemplation. According to Goehr, the paradigm of the musical 
work—whereby performance is understood to be the realization of a composer’s 
ideal aesthetic object—has functioned as a “regulative concept” ever since, with 
deleterious consequences for the vibrancy and creativity of musical culture.3 
Richard Taruskin has argued along similar lines that the proponents of the 
historically-informed performance movement were not, as they had hoped, 
reproducing the music of the past, but in fact creating new music for the present. 
Both Taruskin’s back-handed compliment and Goehr’s interventionist history of 
ideas are typical of a broader shift in musicology from privileging the composer 
and his score to the performer and his—or, just as often, her—audience.  
                                                     
3 Lydia Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of Music 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 7-8. 
 The implicit association of composerly authority with a masculine subject  
has been hugely important in the reconfiguring of the discipline. Most 
importantly, it suggested that composer-centered accounts inevitably perpetuate 
the erasure of women from music history because they relegate to the margins 
those roles—of singer, instrumentalist, patron, etc.—that women have most often 
been in positions to perform. Rather than attempting to rectify the inherited, and 
inherently misogynist, musical canon by adding a relatively small number of 
works by female composers, a new wave of gender-conscious musicologists in the 
1990s sought to disrupt the conventional wisdom that a work was the product of a 
single authorial voice. As Carolyn Abbate demonstrated in Unsung Voices: Opera 
and Musical Narrative in the Nineteenth Century, music’s metaphorical 
polyphony is one of the conditions of its fascination. The fact that a performance 
exceeds any monological interpretation is both a source of pleasure and, crucially, 
a source of power. For once operatic agency is understood to be distributed 
between not only the composer and librettist, but also the singers, musicians, 
conductor, director, designer, and—last but not least—the audience, it is no 
longer convincing to organize discussion around the one name in large print on 
the front of the score. In part this is an argument in favor of reception studies, 
which has affected musicology no less deeply than it has the rest of the 
humanities, but it is also something more than that: by “decentering” the object of 
musical enquiry to the point that object status could no longer be taken for 
granted, exponents of the polyphonic mode of interpretation came to celebrate the 
very intangibility of music and musical meaning. Needless to say, such dedication 
to the pleasures of imprecision were incommensurate with traditional score-bound 
analysis. Little wonder, then, that Abbate was not the only musicologist to 
question the validity of close reading and the methodological reliance on textual 
traces. 
 
 
Approach and Reproach 
 
In 1980, Joseph Kerman published an essay in Critical Inquiry entitled “How We 
Got Into Analysis, and How to Get Out.” The fact that a musicologist chose to 
publish his work in an interdisciplinary journal is itself worthy of note; that 
Kerman went on to expand his arguments into a book-length survey of the field—
described by one reviewer as “a Who’s Who of musicology, and a What’s What 
of theory, analysis, and musical philosophy”—made his work compulsory reading 
for all music scholars at the time.4 The thrust of Kerman’s argument was that 
musicology, in the decades since WWII, had become a dry and dusty field of 
                                                     
4 The reviewer in question was Erich Leinsdorf, whose comments, written for the New York Times 
(26 May 1985), were proudly displayed on the front cover of Kerman’s Contemplating Music: 
Challenges to Musicology (Cambridge, MT: Harvard University Press, 1985). 
study. On the one hand, he took exception to an analytical enterprise that 
appeared to equate aesthetic worth exclusively with structural unity, and therefore 
ignored many of the aspects of musical experience most valuable to audiences and 
performers. On the other hand, he argued that music historians had become 
weighed down by their archival work to the point that they were good at 
collecting dates and facts, but indifferent—or worse—when it came to the 
interpretation of musical meaning. Both symptoms, Kerman suggested, could be 
diagnosed by the term “positivism,” which has echoed down the years as a 
stinging critique of any under-theorized or merely descriptive form of musical 
study. While the temperature of debate surrounding Kerman’s wide-ranging 
critique inevitably cooled in the decades that followed, his call for a more 
humanistic and hermeneutic form of enquiry set the standard for a generation of 
scholars whose work came to be known as the “New Musicology.” 
 Predictably enough, few writers have welcomed a label that was destined 
to grow old almost as soon as it entered circulation. Nevertheless, the notion of a 
New Musicology retains its currency to this day, and helps to identify a particular 
disciplinary “moment,” the like of which has not been seen since. In line with 
Kerman’s pronouncements, many of the practitioners who came to prominence in 
the 1980s and 1990s were concerned with building bridges between musicology 
and the broader humanities. Gary Tomlinson’s widely-cited essay on “The Web 
of Culture”—which, as it happens, was published in a special journal issue of 
“Essays for Joseph Kerman”—advocated a contextualist approach to the study of 
music informed by the cultural anthropology of Clifford Geertz. Later on, 
Tomlinson combined Paul Ricœur’s hermeneutics with Michel Foucault’s 
archaeology of knowledge in his study Music in Renaissance Magic—a book that 
famously included not a single extract from a musical score. Lawrence Kramer’s 
Music as Cultural Practice, first published in 1990, proposed a method of 
interpretation that aimed to render music’s meanings no less legible than 
literature. Kramer’s next book, Classical Music and Postmodern Knowledge, 
added yet more theorists to musicological reading lists, while placing particular 
importance on questions of poststructuralism and epistemology. The early 1990s 
also witnessed Susan McClary’s Feminine Endings, which brought musicology—
sometimes kicking and screaming—into conversation with gender studies. No less 
important, however, was McClary’s discussion in Feminine Endings of both 
popular musicians and high art composers: though it may now seem unremarkable 
for an academic career to take in Madonna as well as Moneteverdi, the initial 
breaching of sub-disciplinary barriers was yet another sign of the turbulent 
musicological times.  
 The New Musicology thus refers to both a new set of approaches to 
musical study and a broadening of disciplinary horizons in terms of repertoire, 
agency, and geography. One way of acknowledging this enlargement of interests 
is to consider the treatment of Gioacchino Rossini (1792-1868) by successive 
generations of musicologists. For Dahlhaus, writing in 1980, Rossini represented 
the lesser of the “twin styles” that typified the musical culture of the early 
nineteenth-century: whereas Beethoven’s instrumental music embodied the full 
breadth and depth of artistic genius, Rossini’s operas belonged in the populist 
realm of spectacular entertainment. By the time of James H. Johnson’s 1996 
account of Listening in Paris, this sort of critical evaluation was less important 
than understanding why audiences for both Rossini’s and Beethoven’s music 
became increasingly attentive and subdued. More recently still, Benjamin Walton 
has researched the reception of Italian opera in South America, thus challenging 
the tacit eurocentrism of traditional accounts of nineteenth-century music.  
Indeed, some historical musicologists now see their work as a branch of cultural 
history, just as ethnomusicology can be seen as a branch of cultural anthropology. 
Thanks to the opening out of disciplinary purview associated with the New 
Musicology, the academic study of music is far less isolated than it once was. 
Nevertheless, the subjects and objects of music studies retain a specificity that 
justifies a unique—if problematic—disciplinary identity.  
 
 
Feeling Hopeful 
 
Predicting the future is a fool’s game, but forgetting the future is no less foolish. 
From the vantage point of the early twenty-first century, the New Musicology 
looks a lot like the New Orthodoxy. What emerged as a series of sometimes 
acrimonious disciplinary arguments about the aims, methods, and scope of music 
studies has now settled into a relatively familiar curriculum of performativity, 
anti-elitism, and identity politics. While I am the first to welcome these 
considerable intellectual advancements, the current generation cannot simply rest 
on inherited laurels. Our responsibility to the present is first to historicize past 
achievements, then attend to what remains undone. In arguing for continued 
progress—and, yes, there is such a thing as progress—I wish to draw attention to 
more than the inevitable mellowing of critical voices when repositioned as the 
declarations of authority. In fact, some recent commentaries on the history of the 
discipline have suggested that the critical edge of the New Musicology was never 
all that sharp in the first place.  
 James R. Currie’s 2009 essay on “Music After All” investigated the 
cultural politics underlying the contextualist approach to musical study, arguing 
for a strategic return to widely-debunked notions of “the music itself.”  Currie’s 
claims rest on the possibility that music’s relative autonomy, to borrow to 
Dahlhaus’s well-worn phrase, harbors a promise of freedom, whichany 
progressive scholar ought not to waste by immediately reducing the aesthetic to 
the level of the social. Another leftist musicologist, J. P. E. Harper-Scott, has 
ventured a more strident critique of contemporary musicology by focusing on the 
work of its best-known exponent, Richard Taruskin. Specifically, Harper-Scott 
suggest the latter two volumes of Taruskin’s Oxford History of Western Music are 
deliberately biased toward Russian and American subjects so that the work as a 
whole can reach its climax in the post-Cold War triumph of North-American 
liberal capitalism. This “end of history” narrative, Harper-Scott argues, does 
considerable ideological work in support of a free market approach to the making 
and receiving of musical “products.” The fact that Taruskin has elsewhere 
criticized scholars for privileging art over entertainment leads Harper-Scott to 
describe Taruskin’s work as “the longest suicide note in musicological history.” 5  
 It would be misleading to suggest that the two authors discussed above 
represent a large section of the musicological community, but that is beside the 
point: their work suggests that ideology critique—which has been linked too 
closely in musicology with the single figure of Adorno—has a significant role to 
play in the future of the discipline. This role need not be as resistant to 
contextualist or sociological approaches as Currie and Harper-Scott might 
suggest. The late Adam Krims’s essays in Music and Urban Geography, for 
example, combine analyses of popular music and political economy in order to 
elaborate on the relations between modern cities and expressive culture. Krims’s 
                                                     
5 J. P. E. Harper-Scott, “Modernism as We Know It, Ideology, and the Quilting Point.” In The 
Quilting Points of Musical Modernism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 3. 
work also belongs to a broader category of studies that can be grouped under the 
banner of “music, space, and place.” Significantly, this emerging body of research 
does not fit easily into any of one of the three disciplinary sub-groupings listed 
earlier in this chapter. Michael Bulls’s Sound Moves: iPod Culture and Urban 
Experience, Steven Feld’s Sound and Sentiment, and Daniel M. Grimley’s 
extensive writing on English and Scandinavian composers’ associations with 
landscape, all draw on symbolic and material geographies to inform our 
understanding of particular practices of listening, singing, and composing. Above 
all, the concern these writers share for “re-materializing” the study of music—
both in terms of the tangible objects of musical culture and the ephemeral 
materialities of acoustic encounter—holds great promise for future enquiries and 
suggests a link, if not a merger, with the relatively new field of sound studies. 
This may seem an odd place to end a survey of musicology for art historians, 
since sound studies and visual culture are not the most obvious of colleagues, but 
it may be precisely in attending to the locations of expressive culture—whether 
noisy, spectacular or a combination of these and more—that our disciplines might 
find most common ground. 
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